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ABSTRACT 
The statutory authority is a little understood administrative 
device which has been widely used in Australia by both State 
and Commonwealth to discharge a variety of responsibilities. 
By briefly charting the administrative history of the Hunter 
District Water Board, this paper presents a case study of the 
debates over management reform and political control of the 
statutory authority. At a more specific level, it suggests: that 
the Hunter District Water Board historically showed a 
reluctance to accept full responsibility for the costs of the 
services ostensibly under its control; that the so called political 
independence of statutory authorities is little more than an 
expedient indictment for politicians' use when the heat is on 
and; that the tensions which existed for many years between the 
engineers and the clerks of the Hunter Water Board, may be 
best seen as the result of clashes between cultures. Although 
for a considerable time , the Hunter District Water Board 
suffered from many of the failings for which bureaucracies are 
commonly criticised, the paper concludes that recently the 
Hunter District Water Board has greatly improved in terms of 
organizational strategies, efficiency, responsiveness and 
responsibility. 
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Patterns of Power: Control Strategies for Statutory 
Authorities 
The Case of the Hunter District Water Board 1892 - 1990 
Introduction 
Patrick N. Troy and Clem J. Lloydl 
Urban Research Program 
Studies of administrative history are difficult because no one piece of 
organisation theory provides a satisfactory framework for examining the 
evolution of an organisation and all the facets of its activities. At some 
times formal organisation structures may have been predominant; at 
others the informal networks in the organisation and the way in which 
they operated may have been; in yet other periods the personality of the 
chief executive may have been the dominant influence. In some periods 
external factors may provide the overwhelming rationale for 
administrative behaviour; in others the 'culture' of the organisation 
prevails. Furthermore, at any one time a variety of processes, amenable 
to quite different theoretical explanations, may be operating concurrently 
in the same or different sections of the organisation. 
The statutory authority is an administrative device which has been widely 
used in Australia at both State and Commonwealth level to discharge a 
wide variety of responsibilities. It is a device which came early in the 
I In the preparation of this paper we would like to acknowledge the 
assistance of Allen Bradley of the Hunter District Water Board and Shelley 
Schreiner and Rita Coles both of the Urban Research Program. The authors 
accept full responsibility for all errors and omissions. 
baggage of governance our forefathers brought with them (Wettenhall 
1968). Along the way it has been developed, almost to a high art form. 
All investment in Australian cities is made, regulated or controlled 
directly or indirectly by statutory authorities yet mostly their operations 
are little understood. Some pioneering essays (Robson 1960, Eggleston 
1932, Sawer 1954) illuminate our perceptions and understanding. 
Generally students of administration have no texts to illustrate or provide 
insights into the workings of organisations which regulate planning and 
building or provide housing, power, communications, water supply, 
sewerage and drainage and transport services. (There are encouraging 
signs that this important deficiency is being rectified, with a number of 
studies underway.) 
Most public sector service bodies, whether as traders, providers of 
services or regulators are ostensibly independent of direct day-to-day 
political control. Currently, politicians of all persuasions claim 
indignantly that these bodies are the sources of inefficiency, of lack of 
responsiveness and pervasive public cynicism about government. They 
rarely acknowledge their own part in the political process that created 
such bodies, or admit that statutory bodies were considered good ideas at 
their inception. Nor do they concede that the rigidity of statutory bodies 
is generally overstated. 
Statutory authorities separated from the executive, were created for 
reasons ranging from fear of corruption, croneyism and patronage 
through to the perceived need to be independent (Troy and Lloyd 1988). 
In most cases politicians and administrators argued that the tasks allocated 
to statutory authorities were 'technical' rather than 'political' and could 
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therefore be entrusted to impartial technocrats. This principle was 
considered particularly appropriate with 'engineering' services such as 
the hydraulic services - water supply, sewerage and drainage - but it 
applied also in other areas where specialist knowledge was essential. 
More recently the social or contestable content of decisions made in the 
operation of even highly technical engineering services has been 
recognised and it has become more fashionable to cite the benefits of 
direct political control and public accountability in their management. 
(Sometimes the shifts appear to be simply the playing out of battles for 
territorial control or imperial conquest by a new group of professionally 
trained people at the expense of the incumbents.) Part of this change in 
attitude to statutory authority control springs from a change in 
perceptions of the political elements of decision making and 
administration. In part, it is also due to the increasing sophistication of 
politicians and the maturation of the political process. 
Creation of the Water Board 
All permanent human settlement must have a reliable supply of potable 
water. The community has generally acted in concert to organise such a 
supply. In Australia, however, individuals in small settlements have often 
made their own arrangements for water supply. In many country towns 
and hamlets the ubiquitous water tank attached by its roof gutter 
umbilical is the main source of domestic water. Economy in the use of 
water is practised to the point of parsimony, and in this driest of 
continents the level of water in the tank or dam is a perennial topic of 
conversation. Occasional attempts have been made by private 
entrepreneurs to develop and operate water supply systems but every 
community has aspired to a publicly supplied communal water supply. 
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They have sought the economies of scale which are invariably beyond 
individual resources. Many small communities have turned their dream 
to reality. Some have organised their own supply, but in Australia public 
water supplies have largely been achieved through State Governments. 
We discuss here the emergence and shaping of the demand for water in 
the Lower Hunter Valley in New South Wales, briefly charting the 
history of the statutory authority, the Hunter District Water Board, 
created to meet and manage that demand. 
The Board was created in 1892 because of the failure of local government 
in the region to accept the responsibility of providing a reliable supply. 
It took over the water supply scheme built by the Department of Public 
Works (PWD) to the 1877 design of William Clark, a British hydraulics 
engineer. The system had supplied water since 1885 and the NSW 
Colonial Government was anxious to force local citizens -to manage and 
pay for their own water. From the outset there was considerable 
ambivalence about the nature of the Board. Its founding members and 
officers wanted the protection, status and conditions of employment of 
public servants yet they sought the operational freedoms and 
independence of a statutory authority. The Board's support in the early 
period for its officers' quest to work under the terms and conditions of 
the Public Service Act was a measure of its naivete, showing no 
understanding of the political instability which existed in Sydney and the 
Colony's legislature. 
To finance the scheme Clark proposed a two-part tariff system, partly 
based on a user charge, which was firmly rejected by the government 
almost as soon as he suggested it. Many members of the public only 
wanted the service in bad years when their own household supplies failed. 
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They objected to the cost of a public supply. They saw it as a kind of 
insurance policy and they wanted it heavily subsidised, giving scant 
consideration to those who might ultimately bear the burden. From its 
inception the Board disputed the debt attributed to it for the capital cost, 
together with operational deficits and interest charges incurred since 
1885. 
Operation of the Board 
The Board has existed for a century but with major changes in 
composition, structure and function (Appendix). From 1892 to 1938 it 
operated water supply, sewerage and drainage systems whose dams, 
service reservoirs, pumping stations, treatment works and mains were 
designed and constructed by the New South Wales Department of Public 
Works. The finished works were then handed over to the Board, at cost, 
for it to manage. The Board had a part-time President, a chief executive 
officer, (Secretary A.E. Fry), an Engineer (J.B. Henson) and a small 
staff. Early in the establishment phase its staffing decisions were heavily 
influenced by patronage considerations which determined the structure 
and operation of the Board for the following ninety years. Following an 
inquiry into its operations, the Board succeeded in having its debt reduced 
in 1897 although it maintained that the debt was still unfairly high. The 
Board's complaints were heeded in 1908 when another recalculation of its 
debt resulted in a further reduction. 
From its inception the Board was organized in two Divisions - the Wages 
Division and the Salaried Division. In the early years the Wages Division 
men (or Manual and Mechanical as they were called) - the men who ran 
the pumps, turned the water on and off, connected the services, dug the 
trenches and laid the pipes - formed a union (the Hunter District Water 
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Board Employees Association) in 1909. Initially management opposed 
moves by Wages Division men to form a union and discouraged moves by 
them to join other unions. Finally they reluctantly agreed to the 
formation of a union covering Wages Division men because they were 
worried that the Wages Division workers might become more difficult if 
they joined one of the more militant industrial unions. The Salaried 
Division Staff - the administrative and supervisory staff - eventually 
accepted that their quest for coverage and respectability under the Public 
Service Act would not succeed so they sought the protection of union 
organisation. In 1921 the salaried officers formed a branch of the 'house' 
union which covered the Wages Division. They sought, however, to 
distance themselves from the blue collar men who constituted the Wages 
Division by maintaining a separate organisation and membership fee 
structure. 
The Union was a peculiar hybrid. It had a President and Secretary but 
each Branch also had its own President and Secretary and was separately 
affiliated - the Wages Division Branch of the Union being affiliated with 
the Newcastle Trades Hall Council whereas the Salaried Branch of the 
Union was affiliated to the Trades and Labour Council in Sydney. 
The establishment phase of the Board ended in 1924 when the second 
major source of water, Chichester Dam, was completed. Its legislation 
was amended and the Board's debt recalculated following an unfavourable 
agreement it was forced to conclude on the price of water it supplied to 
BHP. The period from 1924 to 1938 was essentially a consolidation 
phase. During this period the organisation matured, senior officers had 
more time to devote to civic affairs, the second 'generation' of officers 
rose to leadership, there was little new investment and the salaried branch 
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of the union gradually consolidated its position and gained influence over 
the working of the Board. 
Since it was given the power to construct works in 1938 the Board has 
planned, designed, built and operated its water supply, sewerage and 
drainage systems. The period 1938 - 1972 was marked by great 
expansion, exemplified in the increased volume of water delivered (see 
Table 8), the number of services connected (see Table 5), and the 
numbers of staff (see Table 4). 
Reorganisation of the Board 
New legislation in 1938 gave the Board its first full-time President, wrote 
off more of its debts in a major restructuring of its finances and gave it 
responsibility for its own operations. The new President, George 
Schroder, was an internal appointee with no technical training and only a 
limited understanding of the issues involved in providing and running 
water supply and sewerage services. He carried out a major 
reorganisation of the accounting and administrative functions of the 
Board in 1938, making it highly 'accounting oriented' with administrative 
sections rigidly demarcated from each other. Schroder, an autocrat and 
disciplinarian, set the operational style of the organisation, confronting 
the Wages Division employees and the engineers whom he almost 
obsessively continually tried to 'best'. In this latter behaviour Schroder 
continued a style and set of attitudes first expressed by Fry. 
The rigid, hierarchical structure of the Board was characterised by 
detailed specification of tasks, conservative staff relations, promotion by 
seniority, oppressive dress rules, repressive attitudes to staff development 
and a preoccupation with 'respectability'. These attributes reinforced the 
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hierarchy and made it easier for the Salaried Branch of the union to 
become further involved in and accumulate power over the Board's 
administration (Wilson 1973). 
Schroder was succeeded as President by Frank Finnan in 1953. A former 
politician with no technical knowledge, his appointment was vehemently 
opposed by the .Board's union and the wider union movement and 
community of Newcastle. A man of considerable personal charm and 
social skill he showed early in his term that he was the 'workers' friend' -
the complete democrat who 'even shook hands with them'. Many of the 
rules for behaviour and working conditions established by Fry and 
Schroder were quietly dismantled by Finnan. The Wages Division of the 
Union won greater occupational subdivision and detailed specification of 
tasks as a way of claiming specialisation, recognition of skills or 
reputation and 'ownership' of jobs to create the case for security of 
employment. This contrasted with the Taylorist notions described by 
Littler (1978, 1982) which created casual jobs for wages men. The 
Salaried Branch of the Union which covered 'management' grew in 
influence in the Board's administration and its success in having many 
positions, especially those in the new technologies and professions, 
isolated from the main promotion avenues, led to the 'boxing in' of many 
officers. This defensive initiative by the clerks in the Division had the 
effect of making positions the 'property' of particular people or groups. 
Those members of the Salaried Division who were 'boxed in' had their 
promotion or career development prospects severely curtailed while the 
clerks retained open avenues for progress. 
Early in his stewardship Finnan successfully renegotiated a one-sided 
agreement with BHP which had applied for thirty years to the price and 
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volume of water supplied by the Board. The new agreement significantly 
reduced the subsidy to BHP and introduced a more 'commercial' flavour 
in the Board's relations with the company. Under Finnan's leadership the 
Board's activities increased, much of it funded by raising loans. The 
Board's debt consequently increased rapidly through the 1950s and early 
1960s. Finnan was made a life member of the union and remembered as 
a President who gave the 'men what they wanted'. His defence for 
complying with their requests was that it didn't matter because it simply 
'went on the rates'. The circularity in this approach to financing urban 
services could only be tolerated in situations where the impact was spread 
over a large number of people, the consequences delayed and those who 
paid the price had no direct say in the management of the service. 
The effort by each branch of the union to lay claim to jobs as 'property' 
was recognised in the industrial relations system which confirmed their 
ownership in the various awards and agreements under which both 
branches periodically codified their working relations with the Board. 
Occasionally the ownership of a job was contested by the two branches. 
In these circumstances the bond of union brotherhood was severely 
strained. The most acrimonious dispute occurred over the location of the 
Board chauffeur's job. Another dispute in the early 1980s over the 
location of, and eligibility for, positions as meter readers also generated 
much heat. 
After Finnan the Board had a succession of more conservative Secretaries 
and Presidents who did little to introduce management training or staff 
development. In fairness, there was little interest in administrative 
innovation in the torpid administrative climate of the 1960s and early 
1970s. They were essentially what Lantis (1987) describes as 'heads', 
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depending for their authority on their control of the Board. Their 
history of close involvement in and identification with the Salaried 
officers' branch of the union weakened their managerial prerogatives 
when they were appointed to high office. Clerical officers were judged 
on whether they were good 'clerks' and whether they were 'respectable' 
(respectability in dress, demeanour and behaviour was especially valued 
among women staff members) rather than good administrators or 
managers. The rigid hierarchy in the organisation and promotion on 
seniority meant that by the mid 1950s the expansion of 1938 had created 
demographic distortions. There were many senior officers at the same 
level with similar seniority. This led to severe bunching which, due to 
retirements, meant loss of experience, knowledge and continuity in some 
years. The consequential rapid promotion of young, inexperienced, 
under-trained staff led to massive loss of morale among second level 
execµtive officers who, on realising they would not be further promoted, 
simply served out their time. These demographic factors re-emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s. In the first period they served to frustrate reform, 
in the second they created the opportunity for it. 
Modernisation 
The period since 1972 may be described as one of modernisation and 
reform. By 1972 the criticisms listed by Aungles and Parker (1988:56) 
as the most common criticisms of bureaucracy in general, could have 
been made of the Board: 
1. over-concern with rules - inflexibility - promotes 
growth of 'bureaucratic personality'; 
2. procrastination; 
3. excessive/unnecessary paper-work - 'red tape';, 
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4. excessive conformity - lack of initiative -
resistant to change; 
5. entrenched specialism; 
6. over-centralisation; 
7. duplication of effort across departments; 
8. inter-departmental jealousies and conflicts; 
9. bureaucratic proliferation - 'empire building'; 
10. humanity lacking in dealing~ with the public -
people treated as objects. 
It was apparent from a sequence of embarrassments - including 
allegations that Chichester dam was unsafe, that Seaham Weir and 
Grahamstown dam were leaking to an inordinate degree and problems 
caused by the prolonged and excessive pumping from the Tomago 
sandbeds - that the government had to take action to resolve the 
difficulties faced by the Board. In a major reinvigoration of the Board, 
Professor A. Carmichael was appointed in 1972 as member and in 1974 
as President. 
Carmichael tried to improve the engineering staff by introducing new 
specialisations, bringing in new staff and general reinvigoration. 
Although supported by the Board itself his reforms were resisted by the 
staff of the organisation. Carmichael's relations with the Chief Engineer 
deteriorated to the point where the Board authorised the recruitment of a 
second Chief Engineer to ensure that the Board's directions were carried 
out. A Wages Division employee who exhibited a similar lack of 
cooperation would undoubtedly have been dismissed. 
Under Carmichael's initiative the Board took advantage of a federal 
government program to encourage more rational use of the nation's 
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water resources to commission a jointly-funded consultants' report on the 
future demand for water supply, sewerage and drainage, pricing policy 
and the introduction of computers. He also called for internal reviews of 
the auditing system and the Board's garage and workshops. The Board 
was not always able to implement the recommended reforms due to a 
combination of staff recalcitrance, union opposition, lack of Ministerial 
support, lack of will by the Board and poor diplomacy. On several 
occasions Carmichael unsuccessfully sought Board approval for the 
introduction of a user pays tariff system. The salaried branch of the union 
had become more intensively involved at the core of the Board's 
administration. As a result of government initiatives on worker 
participation, The union President, Barry Fair, had become the staff 
representative on the Board where he played a leading role, taking 
particular interest in management issues. 
Caiden (1969:1) defined administrative reform as 'the artificial 
inducement of administrative transformation against resistance'. There 
was nothing 'artificial' about the transformations attempted by 
Carmichael and the resistance, too, was tangible. 
The Role of the Statutory Authority 
In 1977 the New South Wales government commissioned Professor P. 
Wilenski to conduct a review of its administration. In an Interim Report 
'Directions for Change', Wilenski (1977) drew attention to the 
deficiencies in the New South Wales system. Without calling it 'reform' 
he outlined major initiatives for change including eliminating seniority as 
a criterion for promotion and revising the Public Service Act. 
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Wilenski discussed the role of the statutory authority in public 
administration, concluding that, whatever the merits of their initial 
constitution, they were now too far removed from political control. 
Apart from favouring external reviews of their operations an.d 
commenting on problems of communication between authorities and their 
ministers, the report presented little analysis of the realities of the alleged 
independence of statutory authorities. It did not show how independence 
had resulted in divergence between government policies and the 
operations of authorities. Nor did it give many clues on the ways in 
which a balance between political responsibility and economic prudence 
for the operations of statutory authorities should properly be struck. 
Wilenski made a distinction between the 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' 
decisions of statutory authorities. He implied that while it was 
understandable that they had maintained their independence when they 
were concentrating on the 'quantitative' aspects of their operations, this 
independence was less defensible, or even desirable, when they were 
taking decisions about quality which 'involve larger elements of 
judgment' (Wilenski 1977:58). His illustration for this argument was the 
Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board but his comments 
could equally have applied to the Hunter Board. 
Wilenski's analysis seemed to beg two important questions: firstly 
whether the alleged independence of the statutory authorities from 
ministerial control was always a fact. The power and initiative in many, 
if not all authorities, lay with the government. Governments simply used 
the convention of independence when it suited them, washing their hands 
or distancing themselves from an authority when criticisms were raised, 
reminding people of their independence. But when it was convenient they 
exercised dominant power. There are many illustrations of this but three 
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will suffice. Despite opposition by the Board, the government reduced 
wages during the Depression even though the staff was not covered by the 
Public Service Act. In 1975, despite Board recommendations to the 
contrary, the government directed the Board to introduce a 'tapered' rate 
which was imprudent and highly inequitable. More recently, despite 
Board opposition, the government imposed tariff ceilings, refusing to 
allow it to set an economic or financially prudent rate. 
The second question relates to the complex set of issues involved where, 
because of difficulties in local cooperation or because the externalities and 
benefits have statewide implications, the State government creates a 
statutory authority to deliver a location or area specific service. 
Whatever the political or social realities which caused the governmentto 
set up an authority, it is arguable whether a State minister (especially one 
who may have no connection with the area concerned) ought to have 
continuing power over it. A consequential concern is how the people 
affected, serviced or required to finance the authority should be 
represented on the authority's governing body. 
Despite these limitations of the report the government acted on many of 
Wilenski's recommendations, including elimination of seniority for 
promotions. In the subsequent phase of his review, Wilenski focussed on 
the operation of statutory authorities. He took evidence from the Hunter 
Board and commissioned a series of studies of the operations of various 
authorities, including the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage 
Board (Wilenski 1982) but did not revise his fundamental position. The 
logic of his argument was subsequently endorsed by Williams (1985) in 
an exploration of the concept of bureaucratic neutrality. For many of the 
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more energetic and ambitious in the State bureaucracy, Wilenski's reports 
became a 'bible' of sorts. 
During the conduct of the Wilenski review the problems generated by 
Carmichael's attempted reforms coincidentally were brought into high 
relief. Issues of administrative efficiency emerged on the political agenda 
particularly for the Hunter Board. It was experiencing increased demand 
for services but had run down its accumulated reserves as required by the 
government. The income it could raise from the tariff was constrained 
by rate ceilings and with all public sector agencies, it suffered cuts in 
expenditure due to limits placed on borrowings. Caiden's (1971) 
description of an organisation in crisis was evoked. 
In this climate a concatenation of circumstances broke over the Board: 
discontent over Carmichael's attempted reforms; repeated expressions by 
the union to a succession of Ministers, of opposition to Carmichael's 
reforms in terms similar to those described by Schrier and Mulcahy 
(1988) where middle level public corporation inanagers found union 
officials went over their heads to senior level administrators thus 
breaking down discipline (it was not always clear that these 
representations were entirely separate from the personal ambitions of the 
supplicants); an aggressive new Minister anxious to establish his 
reputation as a trouble-shooter by vigorously wielding a new broom; a 
general desire by the government to implement as many of the Wilenski 
recommendations as possible - especially those which appeared to cost 
little; a President whose term in office was running out. In total, these 
factors persuaded the Government to appoint a new President. 
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Dr. John Paterson was appointed President in March 1982. He arrived 
with clear ideas about the ideal administration and methods of financing 
public services and a firm commitment to reform. Many of the Wilenski 
recommendations, such as those on seniority and equal opportunities, 
were anathema to the Board's union. Paterson was personally committed 
to the idea of promotion on merit and saw that he could use the Wilenski 
proposals to break the union's influence. He also determined to use the 
equal employment opportunities initiatives of the government as a tactical 
measure against the union. Paterson, who earlier in his career had 
worked for the 'white collar' section of the union movement, felt that, for 
efficient operation, there had to be a limit to the union's involvement in 
managing the Board. He believed that 'managers should manage'. 
Paterson quickly set in train a sequence of initiatives designed ·to 
dramatically overhaul the Board's operations and to wrest control over 
the organisation from the union. Although he led the field Paterson's 
determination to manage illustrated a general change in attitude to the 
management of public sector agencies. Ingersoll (1985) reported on 
similar but less comprehensive reforms for Melboume's water authority. 
The Culture of the Board 
An important consequence of the Paterson initiatives for reform via 
cultural change (Paterson, 1983) was the gradual emergence of a new 
sociological self-perception in the language of the Board. Officers began 
referring to the 'culture' of the organisation, meaning the set of customs, 
practices, attitudes and values which affected or determined the Board's 
operations. Although the notion of organizational culture is ambiguous 
and lacks precision (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984) the initiatives taken in the 
Board were consistent with the transformations being wrought in the 
public service generally <Yeatman 1987). The Board's officers perceived 
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that it had a 'culture' which was embedded in the attitudes and practices 
of the staff of the Board (both Salary and Wages Division). If that 
culture was not changed, changes in personnel or rearrangement of 
positions would not lead to improved efficiency. The lack of definition 
meant that 'culture' meant different things to different people. For 
example, the engineers and clerks could refer to their own 'sub-cultures' 
without ever having to engage in a disciplined exchange. Both could 
refer to the culture of the Wages Division which, they agreed, had to be 
changed to produce greater efficiency. Senior officers acted as though 
there was an old culture which produced inefficiencies in the Board's 
operations. They were seemingly unaware, however, that the new culture 
they tried. to inculcate had inherent dangers that it could impede change if 
it did not allow a flexible approach to new problems (Gagliardi 1986). 
The innovations were important in themselves but the Board was also 
being used as a pilot study for similar reforms in the larger more 
complex Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board in Sydney. 
Paterson, a keen student of military tactics, used the elements of speed 
and surprise to take several shock initiatives in pursuit of his objectives 
(Paterson 1983). He created diversions and he deliberately overloaded 
the union's capacity to respond to his proposed changes. In this way he 
kept the union on the defensive, and ensured that it was always reacting 
belatedly to his initiatives. He simultaneously initiated innovations in the 
Board's public operations. 
Paterson endorsed most of the Carmichael initiatives, particularly those 
arising from a strategy review conducted by the international consultants 
Binnie and Partners. He took up the work on a new tariff structure 
which had been initiated by Carmichael, proposing a new tariff system in 
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June 1982, just three months after his commencement. The new tariff 
system was hotly contested by the population, but its early operations 
produced benefits exceeding Paterson's most optimistic expectations and 
allowed the deferment of the construction of a 'fourth water source' . 
This allowed the Board breathing space to reorganise its finances and to 
begin work on a new sewer outfall. Although Paterson considered that 
the Board was too much of an 'engineering' organisation, he avoided the 
antagonisms shown by some of his predecessors towards the engineering 
staff. He was impatient with inefficient administrative practices and set 
about making the organisation more responsive to its customers. He 
delegated responsibility to create interesting new jobs and gave new life 
to old ones, making it appear that the union was engaged in carping 
criticism when it resisted change. His personal style was open and direct 
and his spurning of many of the perks of office generated respect, even if 
somewhat grudging. 
Paterson held office for less than his three-year term but in the time also 
undertook a major review or ' audit' of New South Wales' water 
resources (Paterson 1984 ). He was followed as President and General 
Manager by Allan McLachlan, also an economist and career public 
servant from the New South Wales Water Resources Commission. 
Although less aggressive than Paterson, he shared similar concerns about 
the operations of the water supply and sewerage systems. He continued 
the reforms initiated by Carmichael and Paterson and nursed the 
organisation through its adjustment to the new culture heralded by 
Paterson. He superintended the effective computerisation of the Board's 
operations and introduced significant reforms of his own. During 
Mclachlan' s stewardship the continuing reorganisation of the Board, 
especially at the senior management level (reducing the number of 
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Directors from twelve to seven) and in the rationalisation of operational 
divisions, led to further efficiencies. Staff numbers in both the Salary 
and Wages Divisions fell. During this period of modernisation and 
reform the number of reorganisations of the Board caused some staff to 
react, expressing their frustration and cynicism by circulating the 
following quotation attributed to Petronius 'We trained hard - but it 
seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we 
would be reorganised. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet 
any new situation by reorganising, and a wonderful method it can be for 
creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency 
and demoralisation.' 
Following the change of government in 1988 McLachlan oversaw a new 
legislative basis for the Board including a change in its name to 'The 
Hunter Water Board', implementation of a new structure and functions 
and a major revision of its regulations. Under the new legislation the 
full-time President was replaced by a part-time Chairman and the senior 
full-time executive was made a member of the Board and called the 
Managing Director. McLachlan was Managing Director for the last few 
months of his appointment and was followed by Mr. Paul Broad as 
Managing Director. Also an economist, Broad had been brought into the 
organisation by Paterson to give it additional analytical capability. He 
had established one of the regional offices, one of the last administrative 
reforms initiated by Paterson and implemented by McLachlan. Broad 
had analysed the comparative performance of various Australian water 
authorities for the Australian Water Resources Council (A WRC) and had 
clear ideas about where further improvements in operations might be 
obtained. Broad initiated another reorganisation accompanied by major 
redundancy programs which resulted in large reductions in staff in both 
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the Salary and Wages Divisions. In the eight years following Paterson's 
appointment the total staff fell from 1562 in 1982 to 1280 in 1990. 
Of all Presidents and full time executives of the Board Paterson was the 
only one who exemplified leadership in terms described by Lantis (1987). 
He forcefully used his authority as 'head' of the Board but changed the 
organisational culture so that its staff followed him because they wanted 
to do things his way not because they had to because he was the boss. By 
contrast, Broad adopted the notion that there was an organizational 
culture which he had to continue to reshape, attempting by physically 
relocating all staff, to root out all vestiges of old associations, the 
channels of communication and old networks. 
The demography of the organisation together with the limited and rigid 
redundancy and retirement provisions for public sector employees 
frustrated Carmichael's ambitions at reorganisation. By the time 
Paterson took control the demography worked in his favour as it served 
to aid Mclachlan and Broad together with the revised redundancy 
provisions for employees in State Government departments and agencies. 
Summary 
In summarising the history of the administrative culture of the Hunter 
Water Board three themes emerge: 
1. The acceptance of responsibility for the recovery 
of full costs, or the recovery of those costs from 
its customers. 
2. The extent to which statutory authorities act 
independently of political control. 
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3. The dominance of engineering values in the 
provision of water and sewerage services. 
1. It is clear from the 'prehistory' of the Board that there was strong 
political demand for the provision of a safe, reliable supply of potable 
water in the Hunter region. The pattern of events and behaviour of the 
Board since its creation suggests that at every turn the Board has sought 
to avoid accepting the full costs of providing that supply. The frequent 
restructuring of the Board's debt, the repeated overestimation of the life 
of assets, the continuous request for 'grants' for extension of the system, 
the commitment to extensions of the systems which were known to be 
uneconomic, the reliance on expansion or growth in consumption and, 
until recently, the low level of internal financing of the Board's activities 
all indicate a reluctance to act rationally or to accept full responsibility 
for the costs of the system. 
2. Having created or inherited a statutory authority the desire by 
politicians to use it as a convenient whipping boy is understandable. 
Given its existence and perceived independence Ministers have found it 
convenient to blame the Board whenever anything has gone wrong or 
whenever there has been 'bad news' to impart. But the reality is that the 
Board has always been a 'creature' of the Minister. 
The Board has never been free to set the tariff it wanted - it has always 
had to obtain Ministerial approval. Moreover, when rate caps have been 
set by the government the Board has not had any clear indication of 
where it wanted the services cut to fit within the available resources. 
Even when the government has implicitly directed a cut in the services by 
virtue of the limits it placed on the Board's revenue raising it has refused 
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to indicate where they should be made. In trying to resolve this dilemma 
one consequence has been the frequent deferral by the Board of 
expenditure on system maintenance. Other examples of detailed 
Ministerial control include directions to provide services to specific areas 
- even those known to be uneconomic - and control over salary levels and 
staff numbers. The effect of this has been to limit the freedom of 
operation of the Board and to reduce its efficiency. 
On this evidence the notion of independence of statutory authorities is a 
comforting myth promulgated by politicians to give themselves the 
freedom to legitimately pass the buck. The claim of excessive 
independence is also a convenient, if unsophisticated argument, usually 
couched in terms of the need for more democratic control by politicians 
anxious to extend their power. Claims for the benefits of more direct 
political control have to be balanced by considerations of the quality of 
the decisions. In a study of Canadian Crown Corporations Boothman 
(1989) concluded that external controls, such as Ministerial responsibility, 
must be changed simultaneously with the internal cultural system of an 
organisation for reform to be successful. 
3. The schism between the influence of different professional groups in 
the provision of urban engineering services is more difficult to address. 
It is currently fashionable to decry engineers and their allegedly baneful 
influence in the operation and provision of engineering services 
generally. The history of the Board has been largely one of a continuing 
struggle between engineers and clerks for control. The prejudices 
expressed by both clerks and engineers to one another, the practices they 
both engaged in and the boundaries they drew to demarcate their 
respective territories helped shape the 'culture' of the Board. Recruits to 
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the ranks of either the clerks or the engineers adopted the behaviour and 
values expected of them. 
For the first forty six years engineering leadership was provided 
exogenously because the Board was under the control of the Department 
of Works and its function was to operate and develop the system with 
which it was provided by the PWD. The Board's technical independence 
was severely limited and its engineers were, in effect, under the direction 
of the local senior engineer from the Department. In this situation it was 
relatively easy for the 'clerks' to establish the upper hand in the day to 
day operation of the Board, especially given their dominance in the 
salaried branch of the union. The fact that this continued even after the 
Board became more autonomous alienated the engineers and widened the 
rift. On its foundation Henson was clearly the more experienced, better 
educated man, yet Fry, with the Board's support, was able progressively 
to establish his authority as the senior officer. When the Board was made 
autonomous Corlette had been the Chief Engineer for thirteen years and 
was very experienced yet he was passed over for Schroder. Both 
appointments left the engineers disappointed and with a tendency to be 
uncooperative. 
From 1938 until the 1980s the Board operated as though there were two 
organisations joined only at the top. The Salaried Division was 
effectively split into an engineering and an administrative arm. The 
Wages Division basically worked to the engineering arm. Although 
some clerks worked with the engineers the majority of them staffed the 
administrative services of the Board. The engineering functions of the 
Board were often operated as though they were unrelated to the 
administrative or clerical functions. The engineers were concerned to 
23 
follow 'best engineering practice' in the development of the Board's 
systems while the clerks were content to pursue a rule bound approach to 
operations focussing on the accounting functions and the collection of 
revenue. The Board itself was not a locus of technical wisdom and for 
most of the period the President himself was the source of much of the 
tension between the two 'sides'. One consequence was a form of 
disengagement by the engineers from many of the Board's affairs. The 
practice of only telling the clerks what the engineers wanted them to 
know and of 'presenting' them with the annual estimate for the 
construction and operation of the system and expecting them to 'collect' 
the funds was not a recipe for sound development or management. The 
fault lay on both sides but the pressures under which engineers were 
placed as they pursued their industrial claims in the 1961 Engineers' case 
(APEA CASE 1961) exacerbated the situation. Engineers had to 
demonstrate not only their superior training but the differences in their 
tasks compared with clerks. Activities which had been competently 
carried out by clerks under general supervision of engineers were 
redefined as requiring technical training. The pressure on engineers to 
establish their worth set them apart. The engineers won their case and 
were given an industrial award which atoned for the slights they had 
experienced in the union earlier. The very process of establishing and 
then preserving and protecting their identity and worth confirmed the 
rift, reaffirmed the distinctive cultures of the two groups and provided 
many opportunities for the niggling, destructive contests between them 
for the droplets of power. 
The current processes of change and reform have, at times, been 
presented in terms of a struggle between the 'rational decision making' 
versus 'engineering' decisions. The implication has been that the 
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engineers were not interested in improving the efficiency of the Board, 
but only in the performance of the engineering systems. Many agents of 
change find it is necessary to identify 'devils' or establish a 'good'/'bad' 
dichotomy in order to justify their case. The process of reform in the 
Board at times has been accompanied by such an approach. Some of the 
past investment decisions by the Board may well have led to 'over-
engineering', but it is ironic that the engineers were successfully 
portrayed as being opposed to better management. Apart from Paterson 
and his initiatives which owed much to Carmichael's earlier 
commissioning of Binnie, the attempts to improve the management of the 
Board and to introduce user charging for water were made by engineers. 
It would be more constructive to see the tensions between the engineers 
and clerks as the result of clashes of cultures. In the earlier period the 
clerks were the embodiment of a stifling, at times quite illogical, 
bureaucratic approach to the organisation and to the delivery of services 
which resembled a Weberian approach to administration, criticised by 
Paterson (Paterson, 1988), although they did not favour promotion on 
merit. The engineers were concerned about notions of engineering 
system_s efficiency and a more Taylorist conception of organisation and 
the employment of labour. Later the bureaucratic model was supplanted 
by a managerial model in which the initiatives were taken by engineers 
but, ironically, the professional group which benefited most immediately 
were economists who replaced untrained clerks as the most influential 
administrators. Both Yeatman (1987) and Sinclair (1989) see dangers in 
this cultural transformation because it is based on the assumption that 
private sector values can be imported into public organisations without 
costs or as Cole (1988) points out by ignoring some of the other 
procedural aspects of public sector operation. For Considine (1988) the 
danger lies in a misspecification of the problem as one of a failure of 
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control. It is possible to argue that management of the Board lost some 
control to the union, particularly the Salaried Branch, but there is little 
substance to the proposition that there was any loss of political control. 
The recent history of the Board suggests that greater delegation of 
responsibility and a new critical attitude to the use of resources has led to 
a more responsive organisation in which the costs of alternative 
engineering solutions to problems are brought under scrutiny and where 
information related to management processes is collected, valued and 
used. The old dichotomies are being erased and the number of positions 
which are the 'property ' of either the clerks or the engineers greatly 
reduced. 
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TABLE 1: Hunter District Water Board Presidents•, 1892-1990 
1892-1896 
1896-1901 
1901-1908 
1908-1913 
1913-1914 
1914-1920 
1920-1923 
1923-1927 
1927-1931 
1931-1934 
1934-1938 
1938-1953 
1953-1964 
1964-1968 
1969-1970 
1970-1974 
1974-1981 
1982-1984 
President & General Manager 
1984-Feb 1989 
Hunter Water Board: Managing Directer 
The Hon. A. Brown 
H.D. Walsh 
W.I. Millner 
P. Allan 
H.A. Blomfield 
A.E. Cutler 
c .w.-King 
R. Vowell 
F.G.P. Neilley 
I . Keith Ross 
G.B. Carleton 
C.G. Schroder 
The Hon. F.I. Finnan 
F.K. Duncan 
F.E. Cooksey 
A.I . Rees 
Prof. A.I. Carmichael 
Dr. I . P. Paterson 
A.B. McLachlan 
Feb.1989-June 1989 A. B. McLachlan 
Sept 1989-present P.A. Broad 
*Note: Before 1938, Presidents were part-time members of the Board and the PWD 
Engineer for Newcastle with the exception of A. Brown. After 1938, 
Presidents and the subsequent General Manager/Managing Directors were 
full-time members of the Board. 
28 
TABLE 2: Hunter District Water Board: Senior Omcers, 
1892-1990 
HDWB: Secretary* 
1892-1934 
1934-1937 
1937-1938 
1938-1952 
1952-1964 
1964-1970 
1970-1971 
1971-1973 
1973-1982 
1982-1983 
1983-1990 
*Position of Secretary abolished in 1990. 
HDWB: Chief Engineerf 
1892-1925 
1925-1945 
1945-1965 
1965-1968 
1968-1976{77 
1976-1982 
1976-1982 
1982-1983 
1983- 1985 
A.E. Fry 
M.E. Cooke 
C.G. Schroder 
C.J. Chandler 
F.K. Duncan 
A.I. Rees 
K.J. Boland 
I.I. Robenson 
E.G. Bannister 
F. Jarvis 
W.E. Scholes 
J.B. Henson 
J.M.C. Corlette 
J.W. Attwood 
F.E. Cooksey 
M.A. Hindley 
M.A. Hindley, Chief Engineer, Operations 
& Services 
D. Anderson, Chief Engineer, Development 
D. Anderson, Chief Engineer 
T . Thonon, Deputy Director and Chief 
Engineer 
tPosition of Chief Engineer abolished in 1985. 
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Year 
1892 
1925 
1936 
1938 
1939 
1942 
1960 
1962 
1972 
1974n5 
1979 
1980/8 
TABLE 3: Hunter District Water Board Structure, 1892-1990 
Membership Term 
7Members: 
3 'Official' appointed by Governor of 4 years 
which 1 was President; 
4 'Municipal' elected by Councils 4 years 
9Members: 
1 [President) appointed by Governor; 2 years 
8 elected by COW1Cils of 6 constituencies4 years 
covering Board's area of operations 
7 Members· 
2 [President & Vice President] 7 years 
appointed by Governor; 
5 members elected by councils of 4 4 years 
constilllenCies covering Board' s area of 
operations 
[President Finnan's term extended for 2 years beyond 7] 
Minister Responsible 
Minister for Public Works 
Minister for Public Works 
Minister for Local Government 
Minister for Public Works 
Treasurer 
Premier & Treasurer 
[Special legislation to extend President Finnan' s term for 2 years) 
8Members: 
2 [President & Vice President) 
appointed by Governor; 
3 appointed by Minister from panel 
nominated by local government; 
3 appointed by Minister as experts; 
8Members: 
2 [President & Vice President) 
appointed by Governor; . 
3 appointed by Minister from panel 
nominated by local government; 
2 appointed by Minister as experts; 
1 elected by employees of the Board 
7 years 
4 years 
4 years 
7 years 
4 years 
4 years 
4 years 
Minister for Public Works 
Minister for Public Works Ports 
Minister for Public Works & Ports 
1981/82 
1983/84-1986187 
1987 /88-present? 
Minister for Energy & Water Resources 
Minister for Water Resources & Forests 
Minister for Natural Resources 
Minister for the Environment 
1989 ?Members: 
1 Chairperson; 
1 Managing Director; 
4 Members, all of whom are 
appointed by the Governor, plus, 
1 elected by employees of the Board 
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Minister for the Environment 
not more than 5 years 
not more than 7 years 
not more than 5 years 
not less than 3 & not more than 5 years 
TABLE 4: Staff Numbers in Each Dlvision1 1892-1990 
Salaried Division Wagt!s.Division 
Yeart Adrnin &: Pmfes- Engineers General Prof, Eng Tolal Tolal Total 
Clerical sional &: General Salaried Wsces 
Division Division 
1892 14 0 1 5 6 20 16 36 
1897 17 1 1 5 7 24 20 44 
1902 20 2 1 5 8 28 26 54 
1907 24 2 1 8 11 35 34 69 
1912 59 9 3 9 21 80 53 133 
1917 81 12 4 17 33 114 64 178 
1922 84 9 4 23 36 120 74 194 
1927 118 9 14 32 55 173 111 284 
1932 114 6 12 29 47 161 110 271 
1937 112 6 11 31 48 161 110 276 
1942* 216 80 296 952 1,248 
1947* 157 86 243 478 721 
1952* 156 99 255 514 769 
1957* 175 134 309 807 1,116 
1962* 219 162 381 1,168 1,549 
1967* 224 211 435 926 1,361 
1972 232 115 49 113 297 529 948 1,477 
1977 235 134 77 135 346 582 942 1,562 
1987 284 170 69 154 393 677 749 1,426 
1988* 67 658 726 1,384 
1989* 65 649 631 1,280 
1990 
Notes: t Y car ends 30 I une. 
* Fully disaggregated figures not available for these years. 
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TABLES: Annual Water & Sewer Services, Connections, 1893-1990 
Yeart Water Sewer Yeart Water Sewer 
1893 3,421 1942 52,172 33,332 
1894 3,848 1943 52,653 34,981 
1895 4,640 1944 52,815 36,153 
1896 6,246 1945 54,015 36,802 
1897 6,771 1946 55,171 37,820 
1898 7,315 1947 56,804 39,075 
1899 7,920 1948 58,660 40,451 
1900 8,423 1949 61,215 42,028 
1901 9,086 1950 63,289 43,358 
1902 9,875 1951 65,445 44,308 
1903 10,666 1952 67,122 45,447 
1904 11,211 1953 69,244 46,317 
1905 12,274 1954 71,307 47,497 
1906 13,125 1955 73,770 49,093 
1907 13,704 1956 76,272 50,833 
1908 14,623 52 1957 77,380 51,101 
1909 15,873 228 1958 78,954 52,311 
1910 16,721 652 1959 81,398 53,619 
1911 17,430 1,462 1960 84,497 55,644 
1912 18,177 2,401 1961 86,032 58,631 
1913 18,784 3,457 1962 87,792 61,362 
1914 19,871 4,887 1963 89,283 63,707 
1915 21,032 6,148 1964 91,616 66,510 
1916 22,370 7;1.37 1965 93,646 68,764 
1917 23,014 8;1.84 1966 94,779 70,534 
1918 23,641 9,371 1967 96,755 73,711 
1919 24,496 10,385 1968 99,066 78,276 
1920 25,293 11,328 1969 100,941 80,911 
1921 26,316 12,197 1970 103,308 83,806 
1922 27,282 13,129 1971 105,346 86,426 
1923 28,634 14,011 1972 107,741 88,494 
1924 30,106 15,258 1973 109,664 90,457 
1925 32,262 16,544 1974 112,485 91,982 
1926 34,960 17,658 1975 113,994 94,856 
1927 37,195 18,761 1976 118,376 95,882 
1928 40,033 19,517 1977 120,664 99,331 
1929 41,301 20,082 1978 123,369 104,127 
1930 41,674 20,642 1979 126,585 105,355 
1931 43,335 20,822 1980 129,575 107,310 
1932 43,593 20,878 1981 133,149 109,445 
1933 43,785 20,968 1982 137,336 112,357 
1934 44,021 21,920 1983 142,042 113,671 
1935 44,341 22,548 1984 143,437 116,124 
1936 45,182 23,306 1985 146,154 117,559 
1937 46,225 24,519 1986 146,882 119,240 
1938 47,742 26,144 1987 148,374 120,679 
1939 48,913 27,457 1988 148,861 122,332 
1940 50,341 29,149 1989 151,510 125,938 
1941 51,626 31 ,063 1990 
Notes: tYear ending 30 Jwie. 
1be number of houses connected at the time of the establishment of the Board was 3,018. 
The figures for connections refer to connections 'in use' on the 30th of June and do not include 
premises demolished or otherwise disconnected. Figures also include connections to properties 
outside the Board's area, e.g., Dungog. 
Source: Table data compiled from Annual Reports and supplied by the Hunter Water Board 
32 
TABLE 6: Annual Water & Sewer Services, Kilometres of Mains, 
1893-1990 
Yeart Water ~ewer Yeart Water ~ewer 
1893 220 1942 1,661 914 
1894 222 1943 1,675 919 
1895 240 1944 1,698 921 
1896 253 1945 1,724 925 
1897 262 1946 1,767 933 
1898 277 1947 1,825 943 
1899 285 1948 1,883 959 
1900 288 1949 1,934 967 
1901 296 1950 1,955 978 
1902 317 1951 1,986 990 
1903 332 1952 2,023 1.001 
1904 357 1953 2,033 1,006 
1905 393 1954 2,066 1,019 
1906 430 1955 2,127 1,030 
1907 438 1956 2,179 1,054 
1908 470 39 1957 2,203 1,089 
1909 512 39 1958 2,269 1,149 
1910 529 47 1959 2,316 1,168 
1911 544 48 1960 2,350 1,246 
1912 558 60 1961 2,386 1,293 
1913 570 82 1962 2,431 1,369 
1914 592 92 1963 2,493 1,443 
1915 628 103 1964 2,556 1,494 
1916 661 135 1965 2,609 1,570 
1917 674 166 1966 2,691 1,644 
1918 682 188 1967 2,738 1,703 
1919 705 198 1968 2,799 1,750 
1920 723 214 1969 2,874 1,794 
1921 747 237 1970 2,975 1,821 
1922 768 253 1971 3,074 1,901 
1923 814 259 1972 3,123 1,964 
1924 846 267 1973 3,219 2,024 
1925 882 275 1974 3,303 2,060 
1926 959 285 1975 3,355 2,123 
1927 1,081 295 1976 3,387 2,189 
1928 1,186 301 1977 3,445 2,284 
1929 1,350 306 1978 3,494 2,305 
1930 1,378 320 1979 3,524 2,337 
1931 1,386 322 1980 3,544 2,346 
1932 1,387 325 1981 3,574 2,378 
1933 1,389 327 1982 3,633 2,426 
1934 1,397 396 1983 3,684 2,475 
1935 1,403 399 1984 3,716 2,536 
1936 1,415 401 1985 3,744 2,590 
1937 1,445 446 1986 3,769 2,632 
1938 1,476 483 1987 3,782 2,632 
1939 1,506 623 1988 3,794 2,655 
1940 1,556 789 1989 3,814 2,679 
1941 1,645 892 1990 
Notes: tYear ending 30 June. 
Figures include suction, rising, gravitation and reticulation water mains and gravity and pressure 
sewer mains and represent the nett yearly increase in mains controlled by lhe Board and in use on 
the 30th of June. The figures take into account lengths of line consb'ueled by the Board, 
abandoned by the Board, constructed by the Dept of Public Works and transferred to lhe Board, or 
constructed by some other body and purchased by the Board. 
The Board assumed control over 216 kilometres of water main on establishment 
Source: Table data compiled from Annual Reports and supplied by the Hunter Water Board 
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TABLE 7: Annual Water Consumption, Litres, 1893-1990 
Average Daily Supply Average Daily Supply 
Ycaj Per Connection Per Inhabitant Yeart Per Connection Per Inhabitant 
1893 600.09 119.88 1942 1,333.96 333.55 1894 495.52 98.92 1943 1,417.75 354.41 1895 504.62 101.47 1944 1,374.83 343.69 1896 440.97 88.29 1945 1,491.76 372.96 1897 447.34 95.92 1946 l,465.89 366.46 1898 485.52 97.06 1947 1,537.13 384.28 1899 498.71 99.74 1948 1,453.30 363.32 1900 490.07 97.79 1949 1,436.66 359.14 1901 530.08 100.56 1950 l ,441.70 360.41 1902 515.07 103.01 1951 1,547.49 386.87 1903 480.52 96.15 1952 1,692.15 423.01 1904 447.34 89.47 1953 1,568.45 392.10 1905 472.84 94.56 1954 1,644.64 411.15 1906 518.30 103.65 1955 1,549.77 387.42 1907 495.62 99.10 1956 1,619.59 404.88 1908 518.7 103.74 1957 1,733.20 433.29 1909 512.12 102.42 1958 1,696.24 424.06 1910 456.20 91.24 1959 1,573.04 393.28 1911 489.93 97.97 1960 1,539.58 384.87 1912 512.94 102.56 1961 1,571.31 392.83 1913 584.45 116.88 1962 1,639.28 485.39 1914 648.23 129.61 1963 1,862.54 551.40 1915 627.63 125.52 1964 1,808.03 535.03 1916 722.83 144.57 1965 2,013.51 595.54 1917 690.83 138.16 1966 1,573.04 463.70 1918 672.96 134.56 1967 1,466.88 437.04 1919 767.47 153.48 1968 1,695.60 506.95 1920 789.75 157.93 1969 1,893.08 569.21 1921 823.30 164.71 1970 1,779.06 537.15 1922 785.79 157.16 1971 1,753.39 529.00 1923 779.20 155.84 1972 1,813.89 558.33 1924 884.94 176.98 1973 1,897.22 591.60 1925 916.90 183.39 1974 1,833.80 580.03 1926 977.41 195.48 1975 2,020.55 648.65 1927 1,010.96 202.17 1976 1,884.03 615.68 1928 947.36 189.44 1977 1,930.08 640.79 1929 1,037.60 211.17 1978 1,915.15 645.56 1930 905.36 181.07 1979 1,879.32 642.80 1931 848.76 169.75 1980 1,930.78* 670.11 * 1932 831.44 166.25 1981 1,512.50* 534.52* 1933 858.44 171.66 1982 1,611.50 569.27 1934 879.26 166.75 1983 1,433.90 510.64 1935 929.13 185.80 1984 1,354.00 487.90 1936 1,020.83 204.17 1985 1,428.00 521.10 1937 1,070.38 214.08 1986 1,500.30 547.60 1938 1,086.43 217.26 1987 1,457.00 570.30 1939 1,115.11 222.99 1988 1,418.50 535.80 1940 1,181.49 295.36 1989 1,435.30 545.10 1941 1,099.52 274.86 1990 
Notes: tYear ending 30 June.* Adjusted to exclude emergency supply to Wyong and 
connections to Paterson area during 1980. 
Source: Table data compiled from Annual Reports and supplied by the Hunter Water Board 
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TABLE 8: Total Quantity of Water from all Sources & Estimated 
Poeulation suee•ied, 1893-1990 
Yeart Total Quantity Estimated Pop Ye.t Total Quantity Estimated Pop 
Wara: Sul!l!lied l.Mb] S!!l!l!!ied• Wata: S!!l!l!lied [Mk] S!!J!l!lied• 
1893 748 17,105 1942 25,177 206,832 
1894 695 19,240 1943 26,972 208,484 
. 1895 8(J() 23,200 1944 26,327 209,280 
1896 1,010 31,230 1945 29,156 214,184 
1897 1,214 34,655 1946 29,155 217,956 
1898 1,296 36,575 1947 31,371 223,656 
1899 1,442 39,(i()() 1948 30,798 231,(i()() 
1900 1,508 42,115 1949 31,599 241,036 
1901 1,668 45,430 1950 32,625 247,992 
1902 1,857 49,375 1951 36,967 261,780 
1903 1,846 52,610 1952 41,572 268,488 
1904 1,818 55,500 1953 39,641 276,976 
1905 2,100 60,835 1954 42,805 285,228 
1906 2,453 64,840 1955 41,730 295,080 
1907 2,455 67,845 1956 45,213 305,088 
1908 2,745 72,285 1957 48,952 309,520 
1909 2,931 78,395 1958 48,884 315,816 
1910 2,739 82,230 1959 46,736 325,592 
1911 3,070 85,820 1960 47,614 337,988 
1912 3,362 89,535 1961 49,342 344,128 
1913 3,926 92,025 1962 52,529 296,502 
1914 4,632 97,875 1963 60,698 301,580 
1915 4,744 103,545 1964 60,627 309,609 
1916 5,836 110,280 1965 68,823 316,625 
1917 5,700 113,020 1966 54,419 320,451 
1918 5,713 116,285 1967 52,375 328,324 
1919 6,746 120,395 1968 62,169 335,065 
1920 7,187 124,320 1969 70,522 339,438 
1921 7,779 129,370 1970 67,817 345,897 
1922 7,676 133,790 1971 68,149 352,950 
1923 7,976 140,180 1972 72,292 353,767 
1924 9,577 147,840 1973 76,767 355,315 
1925 10,511 157,025 1974 76,107 359,479 
1926 12,130 169,985 1975 84,996 359,009 
1927 13,505 183,000 1976 82,515 366,181 
1928 13,614 196,310 1977 85,669 366,280 
1929 15,398 203,290 1978 86,971 369,100 
1930 13,772 208,370 1979 86,831 370,090 
1931 13,208 213,155 1980 93,009 372,920 
1932 13,081 213,890 1981 73,508 376,770 
1933 13,463 214,840 1982 80,780 389,770 
1934 13,836 215,550 1983 74,343 398,870 
1935 14,899 219,055 1984 71,085 398,060 
1936 16,685 223,280 1985 76,173 400,490 
1937 17,872 228,725 1986 80,435 402,460 
1938 18,673 235,445 1987 84,569 406,260 
1939 19,688 241,850 1988 78,054 398,010 
1940 21,506 198,928 1989 80,164 402,850 
1941 20,501 204,328 1990 
Notes: tYear ending 30 June. 
•Population supplied figures based on 5 persons per house up to 1939 and on 4 perllOllS per 
house from 1939 to 1960. Afra: 1961, population estimated on a basis of the number of 
persons as determined for each local government area in the 1961 and subsequent census figures 
with yearly revisions and exttapolations. 
Source: Table data compiled from Annual Reports and supplied by the Hunra: Waler Board 
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TABLE 9: Legislation, 1880-1990 
1880 (44 VIC, 14) Country Towns Water and Sewerage Act 
Councils of Boroughs and Municipal Districts empowered to provide an 
adequate supply of water and construct and maintain sewerage works for 
Boroughs and Districts not included in Metropolitan Sewerage Act of 1880 
1887 (51VIC, 18) Country Towns Water and Sewerage Act, Extension Act of 1887 
Defined and extended the operation of certain provisions of and amended the 
Country Towns Water and Sewerage Act of 1880. Authorised government 
loans to country towns to construct water works 
1892 (55 VIC, 27) Hunter District Water Supply and Sewerage Act 
Established a Board of Water Supply for the Lower Hunter, its composition and 
responsibilities. Transferred certain lands and works for water supply 
constructed by the Government and water and sewerage works constructed by 
certain Municipal Councils, to the Board, Board given administrative powers in 
all matters relating to water supply and sewerage. Other provisions relating to: 
Ministerial responsibilities, repayment of cost of works and of certain loans 
made to the Council of the Borough of Newcastle, acquisition of, occupation of 
and payment of compensation for lands required for purposes of water supply 
1894 (57 VIC, 19) Country Districts Water Acts Amendment Act 
Amends the 1892 Act. Extends the period of repayment of loans. Empowered 
the Board to connect premises to the system and recover the expense. Allowed 
deferred payment of water connections. Defined the terms of municipalities 
repayments. 
1895 (59 VIC, 9) Hunter District Water Supply (Partial Duplication) Act 
Permits Board to duplicate tl:te pipeline from Walka to Buttai, as the original was 
inadequate. Transfers control of this property to the Board. 
1897 (61 VIC, 14) Hunter District Water and Sewerage (Amendment) Act 
An Act to amend the Hunter District Water Supply and Sewerage Act of 1892, 
the Country Towns and Hunter District Water Supply and Sewerage Acts 
Amendment Act of 1894 and the Hunter District Water Supply (Partial 
Duplication )Act of 1895 and for other purposes. Extended the ratable area (which would include collieries) and discussed debt terms. Not Printed but 
discussed (Armstrong, pp.54-55). 
1902 (No . 83) Newcastle Sewerage Act 
An Act to sanction the construction of sewerage works for Newcastle and 
suburbs and to provide for transfer to the Hunter District Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board of such works. 
1906 (No. 33) Hunter District Water and Sewerage (Amendment) Act 
Amended Hunter District Water and Sewerage Acts 1892-1897. Amendment 
defined the Board's duties: 1) publishing the boundaries of sewered sections; 2) 
putting in and maintaining drains; 3) spelled out terms of payment (deferred, 
instalment, etc ). 
1916 (No. 20) Hunter District Water Supply Act 
Allowed construction of Chichester Dam - Chichester River Gravitation 
Scheme. Listed but not printed. 
1924 (No. 6) Hunter District Water and Sewerage (Amendment) Act 
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Changes the composition of the Board: 1 member appointed by the Governor, 8 
members elected. Consolidated the many enactments so far. Empowered 
the Board to enact regulations and by-laws regarding catchment areas, water 
supply, licence fees, works, etc. 
1928 (No. 44) Hunter District Water Sewerage (Amendment) Act 
Restructured the finances of the Board, giving it full autonomy. 
1938 (No. 11) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage Act 
Debts written down, given a new Board power to raise funds, which will be 
guaranteed by the Government and construct works. Intended as a pump-
primer. 
1945 (No. 37) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Amendment in provisions for changes in areas (geographic) referred to in the 
Second Schedule - concerning representation on the Board 
1952 (No. 5) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Put power in the hands of the Minister for Public Works, with the consent of 
Council. Waived interest still owing for the 1930 - 38 and 1939 period. 
(No. 36) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Further Amendment) 
Act 
Raised the limit of rates from 7.5 percent to 15 percent and changes the basis for 
rating. 
1956 (No. 23) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Makes provision for moneys in reserves for loan repayment. Raises pay of the 
Board. 
1962 (No. 19) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (President) Act 
Special Act to enable Honourable Francis Joseph Finnan to continue as 
President for two more years 
1964 (No. 35) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Increase in pay for Board. 
1965 (No. 21) local Government and Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage 
(Amendment) Act 
Amended Local Government Act of 1919 regarding subdivision of land; 
prohibits sub-division of land within area of operations of the Hunter District 
Water Board unless certain requirements are met. New conditions re: contracts 
between land owners and the Board. Board given powers relating to 
agreements for construction of water and sewer mains and ancillary works. 
1970 (No. 9) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Empowered the Minister to impose water restrictions, impose fines and cut off 
supplies. Limited legal action against the Board. 
1971 (No. 69) Hunter District Water Sewerage andDrainage (Payment of Rates) 
Amendment Act 
Required reductions in water, sewerage and drainage rates by certain classes of 
pensioners. 
1972 (No. 27) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Reconstituted the Board, bringing it under Ministerial control, increasing expen 
component, decreasing municipal representation. 
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1973 (No. 74) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Provided for increase in allowable rebate of rates for certain classes of 
pensioners, and empowered Hunter District Water Board to vary these rates by 
by-law; reduced rates on residential land for Maitland. 
1974 (No. 12) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Extends circumstances under which minimum amounts of rates may be levied to 
provide for the treatment of each flat in a building of flats as a separate ratable 
parcel; allows differential rates and provides for objections to and adjustment of 
levies. 
1975 (No. 64) Hunter District Water Sewerage andDrainage (Amendment) Act 
Amendments relating to rates much as 197 4. 
1976 (No . 40) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Rating) Amendment 
Act 
Waived rates for lands with the Mines Rescue Board. 
1977 (No. 29) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Limited increases to rates on certain residential land. 
(No. 115) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Further Amendment) 
Act 
Amendments relating to power of Hunter District Water Board to conduct 
inspections of misuse or over-consumption and the penalties involved. 
1979 (No. 19) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Coal Mining) 
Amendment Act 
Amendment to the Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage Act of 1938 
with respect to disputes involving coal mining 
(No. 48) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Plwnber Gasjitters and 
Drainers) Amendment Act 
Provided for licensing of plumbers.to ensure accordance with the Plumbers 
Gasfittcrs and Drainers Act of 1979. 
(No . 55) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Elections) Amendment 
Act 
Provided for the election of a member of the Hunter District Water Board by 
officers and workmen of the Board. 
1980 (No . 143) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Rating) Amendment 
Act 
Redefined pensioners re: rate concessions, extended the class of persons eligible 
for rating concessions. 
No. 167) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Enabled Board to rate on 'land values' instead of 'unimproved values', and to 
levy extra rates for remote districts. 
1982 (No. 163)Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Amendment to Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage Act of 1938. 
Reduction of charges to certain classes of pensioners. Hardship fund 
established. Modification of Public Works Act of 1912, with respect to 
appropriation/ resumption. 
1983 (No . 84) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Rates) Amendment 
Act 
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1984 (No. 153) Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 
Minor amendment to Act 11 of 1938. 
1985 (No23) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Amendment) Act 
Provision for payment of rates by three instalments 
(No. 101) Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage (Flood Liable Land) 
Amendment Act 
Amendment to section 91 (1) of Act 11, 1938 
1986 (No. 43) City of Newcastle Act 
Amendment to first schedule of Act 11, 1938 
(No. 53) Miscellaneous Acts (Area Health Services) Amendment Act 
Amendment to section 91 of Act 11, 1938. 
(No. 220) Miscellaneous Acts (Leasehold Strata Schemes) Amendment Act 
Amendments to sections 89A, 104A, 104AA of Act 11, 1938 
1987 (No.140) Water Supply Authorities Act 
The 'Hunter District Water Board' constituted as a corporation. Number of 
members, their qualifications and whether full or part time decided by 
Governor. Board to consist of 8 members appointed by the Governor. One 
member appointed President and is full time member, remaining 7 members are 
part time. Of part time members, 1 to be appointed Vice President, 5 nominated 
by the Minister and 1 elected by employees of the Board. Local Government 
Association of New South Wales and Shires Association of New South Wales 
may submit to Minister a joint nomination of a panel of council officers from 
which to select persons for appointment to the Board. 
(No. 141) Water Board Act 
The 'Water Board' constituted as a corporation. Board to consist of 7 
members, 1 of these is Managing Director and 6 members appointed by 
Governor. Appointed members are part-time and 1 of these is elected in manner 
prescribed in regulations. Governor may appoint Managing Director and Deputy 
managing Director. Board empowered to employ such persons as are necessary 
to exercise its functions 
(No. 143) Water Legislation (Repeal Amendment and Savings) Act 
Repealed whole of Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage Act of 1938. 
Provided for enactment of Water Supply Authorities Act, 1987 and Water Board 
Act 1987 in place of Hunter District Water Board.Act 
(No. 213) Hunter District Water Board Employees Provident Fund (Special 
Provisions) Act 
Facilitated transfer to Public Authorities Superannuation Fund, of contributions 
made by Hunter District Water Board to Hunter District Water Board Employees 
Provident Fund; validated transfer to New South Wales Retirement Fund, 
contributions made by employees of that Board to Hunter District Water Board 
Employees Provident Fund and provided for related matters. 
1988 (1988, No. 119) Hunter Water Board Act 
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Constituted the Hunter Water Board and conferred and imposed on it functions 
relating to the supply of water and the provision of sewerage and drainage 
services. 
1989 ( 1989) Water Legislation (Repeal Amendment and Savings) Act 
Minor amendments through several related Acts (miscellaneous and other). 
1990 
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